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GENDER IDENTITY BEHIND BARS: AN ANALYSIS OF
KOSILEK V.SPENCER

MOIRA COOPER

I.

INTRODUCTION

It was 1952.' Michael was just a toddler when his mother left him
at the orphanage.2 It was immediately apparent that the boy was
"different." 3 Nearly every adult figure in Michael's life admonished him
and tried to force him to conform to social dictates.! But Michael could not
be changed. Although his life came to be plagued by a variety of tragedies,
he is now known for one thing in particular: he has "a strong and persistent
5
belief that he is a woman trapped in a man's body."
By ten-years-old, Michael was dressing up as a female and
experiencing extreme confusion about his gender identity.6 Just before his
eleventh birthday, he was reunited with his mother, but his familial
relations remained troubled.7 Michael was repeatedly raped by his
grandfather.8 He was also stabbed by his stepfather after announcing his
proclaimed desire to live as a girl.' As a teenager, Michael was forced to
run away from home.1" Confused and alone, he began a life of prostitution
and illegal drugs, often dressing as a woman."
From 1967 to 1968, Michael received female hormones from a
physician in exchange for sex.' 2 He grew breasts and finally began to "feel
normal." 3 However, peer cruelty escalated and Michael dropped out of
' Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 163 (D. Mass. 2002).
2Id.

3See id.
"See id.
5
Id.
6 See id.

7Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 163.
8Id.
9Id.
10
d.
1

Id.

12 Id.

" Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 163.
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high school.' 4 He was in and out of prison due to his perilous lifestyle.' 5
Michael was regularly berated and assaulted on the street for his appearance
and demeanor. 6 While imprisoned, Michael was gang-raped, suffered daily
torture, and feared for his life. 7
In an ultimate criminal act, Michael murdered his wife and received
a life sentence without the possibility of parole. 8 Michael, now known as
Michelle Kosilek, struggles to live through daily incarceration and to search
for his "cure." 9
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution reads:
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusualpunishments inflicted."2 One major issue prisoners face
with regard to their Constitutional rights is determining which types of
medical treatment (or lacks of treatment) violate the Eight Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Supreme Court has
decided that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,'. . . proscribed
by the Eighth Amendment."'" Thus, any prison personnel charged with the
care of inmates may not show indifference-or worse, intentional
disregard-for the medical needs of a prisoner.22 In fact, a valid claim for
inadequate care of a serious medical need can constitute a valid cause of
action under Section 1983.23
A typical lawsuit arising from these issues would involve a prisoner
who is seeking treatment that his prison doctors have refused to prescribe.24
However, the issue becomes even more complicated when prison doctors
actually prescribe some sort of treatment that the prison administration
refuses to endorse.25 Does the denial of prescribed treatment for medically
recognized conditions always constitute cruel and unusual punishment?
This is a particularly contested issue with respect to conditions that are little
understood by the public, or widely viewed as nonessential to physical
wellbeing, such as "gender identity disorder" ("GID"). To what extent does
14 Id. at 164.
'5 Id. at 163-64.
16 Id. at 163.
1' See id.

'8Id. at 164.
19 Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 164.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
21 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 173 (1976) (internal citation omitted).
See id. at 104-05.
23 Id. at 105; see 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2006).
24 See Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 204 (D. Mass. 2012).
25 See id. at 197-98.
22
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the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution protect a
prisoner's right to GID treatment?
11. GID
The traditional model of gender identity is a binary system that
associates particular genders with the biological sexes. 26 Thus, the "inner
sense of self' that gender identity embodies is "aligned" with sex, as a
feminine individual would be to a biological female.27 These gender
"constructions" assume a correlation between sex and gender does not
always exist, but that has been entrenched by cultural values and
socialization.28 For others, there is adisconnect between "anatomical birth
sex and psychological gender."2 9
When gender identity does not "match" sex, an individual has what
is commonly referred to as gender identity disorder ("GID").3 ° GID is a
medically recognized mental condition that has been acknowledged by the
American Medical Association, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders ( 4th ed., "DSM-IV-TR"), and the International
Classification of Diseases (10th revision).31 The DSM series is a publication
by the American Psychiatric Association, the professional organization
representing United States psychiatrists, containing a listing of psychiatric
disorders that are currently supported by sufficient empirical data.3 2 In the
DSM-IV-TR, GID is characterized as a "persistent discomfort with one's

26

Sexual Orientation & Gender, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparent
hood.org/health-topics/sexual-orientation-gender-4329. htm (last visited July 1,2013).

27

Gender Identity Disorder, GLAD, www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/gid-fact-

28

sheet.pdf (last visted July 1,2014).
Rose McDermott & Peter K. Hatemi, The Profession:DistinguishingSex and

29

Gender,44 PS: POL. SCI. & POL'Y. 89, 90 (Jan. 14, 2011).
GenderIdentity Disorder,supranote 27.

30ld.

31 See Massachusetts Medical Society, California Medical Association, & Medical
Society of the State of New York, Removing FinancialBarriers to Care for
TransgenderPatients,AMERICAN

MEDICAL ASSOCIATION HOUSE OF DELEGATES

122 (A-08), available at http://www.gires.org.uk/assetsfMedproAssets/AMA122.pdf
(hereinafter "RES. 122 (A-08)").
32
RESOLUTION

DSM-IV Frequently Asked Questions, AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
available at http://www.psychiatry.org/practice/dsm/dsm-frequently-asked-questions

(last accessed March 17, 2013). Author's note: since the time of this writing, the
American Psychiatric Association has updated to the DSM-V, which may not be
entirely consistent with the information provided herein).
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assigned sex and with one's primary and secondary sex characteristics,
which causes intense emotional pain and suffering."3 3
The American Medical Association has expressed the necessity of
medical treatment for GID, including the use of hormones and possibly sex
reassignment surgery to alter genitalia and other sex characteristics, based
on personal need.34 It stated that untreated GID can result in "clinically
significant psychological distress, dysfunction, debilitating depression and,
for some people without access to appropriate medical care and treatment,
suicidality and death. 35 Additionally, the delay of treatment can "cause
and/or aggravate additional serious and expensive health problems, such as
stress-related physical illnesses, depression, and substance abuse problems,36
which further endanger patients' health and strain the healthcare system.
The Association further stated that reputable medical research has
demonstrated the "effectiveness and medical necessity of mental health
care, hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery as forms of therapeutic
treatment for many people diagnosed with GID."37 Thus, the Association

opposes the limitation of GID care that has been prescribed by sound
medical opinion.38 Similarly, it opposes any discrimination towards the
39
gender-diverse community.
1II. MEDICAL TREATMENT IN PRISONS

Because the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment is accepted and enforced within prisons, prison staff may not
disregard the medical needs of an inmate.4" But debate arises over the
extent to which GID treatment is required, considering the specific,
individual nature of GID. Several options exist, from counseling, to
hormone therapy, all the way through full sex reassignment surgery.4'
The original purpose of the Eighth Amendment was to prohibit
torture, physical violence, and other barbarous practices at the hands of the

33 REs. 122 (A-08), supra note 31 (citing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders, 4th ed. text revised).
34 Id.

35 Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.

38 Id.
39

40

Id.

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976)

4'E.Coleman et al., Standardsof Carefor the Health of Transsexual,Transgender,
and Gender-NonconformingPeople, 13 INT'L J. OF TRANSGENDERISM 165, 171
(2011).
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state.42 It has evolved to encompass "broad and idealistic concepts of
dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency. '43 Thus, all penal
measures must be compatible with "the evolving standards of decency that
44
mark the progress of a maturing society.,
Courts must be vigilant in protecting prisoners' rights to medical
treatment because inmates have no option but to "rely on prison authorities
to treat ...

medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will

met."45

not be
In general, to prove that a prison official is liable for failing
to meet an inmate's medical need, the inmate must satisfy both objective
and subjective aspects of a two part test: (1) his "medical need [is]
objectively serious" and (2) the official "acted with deliberate indifference
to the prisoner's health or safety. "46
"Deliberate indifference" requires a higher level of culpability than
a mere "negligence" standard.4 7 It means "more than ordinary lack of due
care for the prisoner's interests or safety," but less than "acts or omissions
for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will
result."48 Because the deliberate indifference standard is more than
negligence but less than an act done knowingly or purposefully, it can be
equated most closely with the concept of recklessness.4 9 Of course, acting
knowingly or purposely will also satisfy the standard, because these mind
states encompass a greater degree of culpability than does recklessness.5 °
To possess this indifference, a prison official must both "be aware of facts
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference."'"
Some courts have described an objectively serious medical need as
one that "has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one
that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102.
Id. (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 968)).
44 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
45
Id. at 103.
46 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05;
Chapman v. Keltner, 241 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2001).
47
Farmer,511 U.S. at 835.
48 Id. (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
42

43

41 See Id.
5oSee id.

'Linda D. Chin, A Prisoner'sRight to Transsexual Therapies: A Look at Brooks
v. Berg, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 151, 167 (2004) (quoting Farmer,511 U.S.
at 837).
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necessity for a doctor's attention."52 In the New York case Brooks v. Berg, a
biologically male inmate brought a suit requesting treatment for his GID.53
When determining whether he had serious medical needs, the court
considered: "(1) whether a reasonable doctor or patient would perceive the
medical need in question as important and worthy of comment or treatment,
(2) whether the medical condition significantly affects daily activities, and
(3) the existence of chronic and substantial pain."54
IV. KOSILEK V SPENCER: A LANDMARK CASE
On September 4, 2012, District Court Judge Wolf took an
unprecedented step and ordered an injunction for a prisoner's sex
reassignment surgery.55 In Kosilek, plaintiff Michelle Kosilek, a biological
male, brought forth an action to request an injunction for a reassignment
surgery.56 Kosilek is a relatively unsympathetic character. She is serving a
life sentence for murdering her wife.57 She suffers from extreme mental
anguish as a result of her GID.18
Kosilek has always had a "strong and persistent belief that [s]he is a
woman trapped in a man's body."59 She has suffered lifelong abuse for this
belief, including being stabbed by her stepfather and prostituted by medical
doctors in return for hormone therapy.6" "This anguish has caused Kosilek
to attempt to castrate [her]self and to attempt twice to kill himself while
incarcerated, once while he was taking the antidepressant Prozac."61
The Massachusetts Department of Correction's ("DOC") doctors
prescribed Kosilek various treatments, including the ultimate
recommendation of sex reassignment surgery.62 They explained that sex
reassignment surgery is the only adequate measure that will help her
Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Zentmyer v.
Kendall County, Ill., 220 F.3d 805, 810 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations
omitted)).
53Brooks v. Berg, 270 F. Supp. 2d 302, 305, vacatedin part, 289 F. Supp. 2d 286
(N.D.N.Y. 2003).
52

14 Id. (quoting Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal citations
omitted).
11 Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 198 (D. Mass. 2012).

56 Id. at 196.
57
Id.at 197.
58 Id. at 202.
59

1Id. at 213 (quoting Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 163 (D. Mass.
2002).

60 Id.

61 Id. at 214.
62 Id. at 197.
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recover from a great likelihood that she would otherwise commit suicide.63
Still, the Commissioner of the DOC, Kathleen Dennehy, would not comply
with the doctors' orders. 64 The 65state argued that it would create
"insurmountable" security problems.
When applying the relevant analysis, it is clear that Kosilek's
Eighth Amendment claim is strong. She was able to establish both prongs
of the test to find whether a prison's actions constitute67 an Eighth
66
Amendment infraction. Thus, the court ruled for the Plaintiff.
First, Kosilek had a "serious medical condition," as evidenced by
her diagnosis. 68 The DOC doctors prescribed the most radical treatment
available, surgical intervention, which exhibits the severity of the
condition. 69 Kosilek had extreme physical manifestations of her GID,
including depression and self-mutilation.7 °
Second, Dennehy's denial of the prescribed treatment was
deliberately indifferent, satisfying the subjective prong of the analysis. 7'
Although Dennehy recognized the severity of Kosilek's needs, she did not
allow her treatment to follow the suggested course.72 Further, she did so for
selfish and/or superficial reasons such as fear of negative publicity and
personal bias.73

However strong Kosilek's Eighth Amendment claim may be, the
remedy is not necessarily injunctive relief. Judge Wolf clarified that an
inmate is not entitled to "ideal care" or whatever care she chooses.74
Instead, "[c]ourts must defer to the decisions of prison officials concerning
what form of adequate treatment to provide an inmate. ' 75 But the court has
the ultimate task of deciding whether the care actually given to the inmate
is adequate and sufficient.76
In this instance, the severity of Kosilek's condition, combined with
the bad faith of the prison administrators, caused Judge Wolf to issue an

Id..
Id. at 197-98..
65
Id.at 198.
66
Id.at 236-37..
67
1d. at 240.
68
1 d.at 229.
69
1Id. at 197, 230.
70 Id. at 229..
71See id.
at 201-03, 237-38.
72 Id. at 197-98, 202, 237
73Id. at 203.
63
64

74

Id.at 208..
199.

71Id. at
76 Id.
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injunction for sex reassignment.7 7 This heightened remedy required Kosilek
to prove more than that which satisfied the initial Eighth Amendment
claim.7" For an injunction, Kosilek was required to prove that:
(1) [H]e has a serious medical need; (2) sex reassignment
surgery is the only adequate treatment for it; (3) the
defendant knows that Kosilek is at high risk of serious
harm if he does not receive sex reassignment surgery; (4)
the defendant has not denied that treatment because of
good faith, reasonable security concerns or for any other
legitimate penological purpose; and (5) the defendant's
unconstitutional con- duct will continue in the future.79
This novel test creates a high threshold that will limit the injunctive
remedy to very severe cases.
The court gave several reasons to support its conclusion in this
case. First, the medical necessity of sex reassignment surgery for some
individuals with extreme forms of GID is becoming more widely
recognized. For instance, in 2010, the United States Tax Court held that
"the costs of. . . hormones and sex reassignment surgery are for certain
individuals, tax deductible as forms of necessary 'medical care' for a
serious, debilitating condition that is sometimes associated with suicide and
self-castration, rather than nondeductible expenses for 'cosmetic'
treatment."81 The scientific community has embraced the needs of
individuals with GID.82 Now, the legal community is following suit.
Next, despite the state's argument that Kosilek's treatment denial
was based on security concerns, Judge Wolf ruled that the real reason for
denial of Kosilek's surgery was a fear of "controversy, criticism, and,
indeed, ridicule, and scorn." 83 As Deputy Commissioner, before she was
promoted to lead Commissioner of the DOC, Kathleen Dennehy attempted
to fire DOC doctors who recommended sex reassignment surgery for
Kosilek.84 As Commissioner, Dennehy proceeded to halt certain prescribed
GID treatments that transsexual inmates, including Kosilek, were using.85
77

78

Id. at 200, 251
Id. at 200.

79 id.

8

0 Id. at 197.

id.
See, e.g., RES 122 (A-08), supranote 31.
83 Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 247.
84 Id. at 201-02.
85 Id. at 202.
81

82
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She also testified untruthfully on several occasions.86 For instance, Dennehy
claimed that she did not know sex reassignment surgery was prescribed for
Kosilek, and that claim was proven false.87 The Commissioner even
testified that she would rather retire than obey the Supreme Court's order to
comply with a sex reassignment surgery injunction.88
Given Dennehy's apparent dishonesty, the court found that
"deliberate indifference" was present in this case.89 Dennehy's actions as
Commissioner and during trial evidenced her impure motives for denying
9 She acted with a pattern of dishonesty that discredited
Kosilek's surgery."
her purported motive of "security concerns." 9' Dennehy does not have the
medical credentials that are necessary to substitute her judgment for that of
a professional DOC doctor. In any case, Dennehy ultimately admitted that
could be reasonably assured by placing Kosilek in
the safety of Kosilek
92
custody.
protective
Kosilek v. Spencer is a groundbreaking case. It is the result of years
of litigation, beginning in 2000 with Kosilek v. Nelson,93 affirmed by
Kosilek v. Nelson,94 and entered into judgment as Kosilek v. Maloney.95 As
this case has evolved throughout a 12-year span, the medical community
has changed and embraced the needs of those afflicted with GID. The effect
of the medical push has enabled courts to look past traditional notions and
embrace a new sense of fairness. Kosilek's severe medical necessity,
juxtaposed against the inequitable methods of the prison administration to
avoid the necessary treatment, created a perfect storm for the Massachusetts
court to make such a ruling.
V. ANALYSIS

GID/Eighth Amendment claims often arise in prisons when, for
example, prisoners with GID wish to dress and be treated differently than
others in the facility due to dissimilar gender roles. 96 Prisoners may also
86
87

Id.
Id.

88 Id.at 201.
89 See id. at 249-250.
90 See id.

9'See id.at 240.
92

Id.at 243.
No. 92-12820-MLW, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13355 (D. Mass. Sept. 12,

93C.A.

2000).
See 29 F. App'x. 621, 622 (1st Cir. 2002).
9'See 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (2002).
96See Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 883 (E.D. Wis. 2010); see also
Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 197-98..
94
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contest the ability of prison staff of a particular sex to perform searches and
pat downs on them.97 Because the prisoner's gender does not match his or
her biological disposition, it will generally not match the sex of the prison
staff searcher (whose sex is typically controlled by the sex of the inmate).98
In the same line of rationale, prisoners may challenge their placement in
units with prisoners of a sex to which they do not relate or who harass
them.99 However, litigation concerning GID medical care is arguably the
most crucial of this array of concerns; inmate health can be a matter of life
or death. As such, the focus on Kosilek is of great importance to the
prisoners' rights movement.
Caselaw illustrates that prisons today generally recognize GID as
an objectively serious medical need that triggers Eighth Amendment
protections.' ° Thus, at least some type of medical treatment is warranted. 10°
However, in some relatively recent cases, courts have fallen short of
deciding which treatments are necessary to adequately treat GID in
particular instances."12 For example, individuals exhibit different
symptoms. Some individuals with GID experience adequate treatment with
psychotherapy alone, through which they can "integrate their trans- or
cross-gender feelings into the gender role they were assigned at birth and do
not feel the need to feminize or masculinize their body."'0 3 Other
individuals need hormone therapy, surgery, or both.'0 4 Still, others can go
without any treatment. 0 5 They can feel satisfaction from simply changing
gender roles and expressing this change to the community (hopefully, with
10 6
recognition).
9 See Konitzer, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 894.
98See id.; see also Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that cross-gender, clothed-body searches of prisoners by prison
officials may violate the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, but that these
violations have been limited to searches of female prisoners by male officials).
99See Sydney Tarzwell, The Gender Lines Are Marked with Razor Wire:
Addressing State Prison Policies and Practices for the Management of
TransgenderPrisoners,38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 167, 170 (2006).
.oo See Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 230 (citing,e.g., Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d
99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995);
Phillips v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 731 F. Supp. 792 (W. D. Mich. 1990), aff'd,
932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991);. Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 411-413
(7th Cir. 1987)); see also Konitzer, 711 F. Supp. 2d at 905.
o'0
See Kosilek, 889 F. Supp. 2d at 198.
102 See, e.g., Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 413..
103 Coleman et al., supra note 41, at 170.
104 Id.
05

1
0

Id.

1 6 See

id.at 170-71
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Beyond the individual's degree or expression of GID, past
treatment can affect the level of continued care necessary in a particular
case." 7 For instance, if someone has pursued hormone therapy for an
extended period of time, negative physical effects can occur when the body
is forced to adjust back to a lack of those hormones.'0 8 The same can be
said for individuals who have already begun initial surgical procedures for
sex reassignment. When a person is incarcerated during these unique times,
extra measures can become necessary to maintain proper health.
Some courts have allowed prisons to withhold relatively
manageable and effective remedies from prisoners.'0 9 Hormone therapy,
even when it is specifically requested by the inmate or prescribed by prison
doctors, can be denied."' In the two illustrative cases of Supre and Lamb,
prison officials rendered some type of treatment for GID but did not give
the inmates hormone therapy."' The respective courts refused to
acknowledge a constitutional right to hormone therapy under the Eighth
Amendment while some other "reasonably effective" treatment options
were made available instead." 2 Still, neither court denied the fact that the
transsexual inmates in question were constitutionally entitled to at least
some type of medical treatment." 3 For example, in Supre, prison officials
chose to administer the inmate "testosterone replacement therapy and
mental health treatment" rather than the estrogen therapy the 4 prisoner
requested, and the court accepted this administrative prerogative."
Meriwether v. Faulkner provides an enlightening illustration of the
modem discourse on GID treatment in prisons." 5 In Meriwether, a
biologically male inmate was initially denied any treatment for his GID,
including chemical, hormonal, psychiatric, or surgical remedies." 6 Prior to
incarceration, that inmate received estrogen hormone therapy for nine
years."' 7 Initially, the district court dismissed the entire action for failure to

See e.g., Phillips v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 731 F. Supp. 792, 794, 797, 800 (W.D.
Mich. 1990), aff'd, 932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991).
108 See id.
109 See Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 962-63 (10th Cir. 1986); Lamb v.
Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351. 353-54 (D. Kan. 1986).
107

110 See Supre, 792
".. See Supre, 792
112 See Supre, 792
113 See Supre, 792
"4

F.2d at 963; Lamb, 633
F.2d at 963; Lamb, 633
F.2d at 963; Lamb, 633
F.2d at 963; Lamb, 633

Supre, 792 F.2d at 960.

F. Supp. 2d at 353-54.
F. Supp. 2d at 354.

F. Supp. 2d at 353-54.
F. Supp. 2d at 353

11Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1987)
116
117

Id. at 410.
Id
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state a claim."' But on appeal, the ruling was reversed and the case was
remanded for further consideration. 1 9
The court found that the inmate's GID diagnosis was appropriate
(under guidance from the American Psychiatric Association's DSM-IVTR)."2 ° Thus, he had an objectively serious medical condition.' 2 ' The
inmate's Eighth Amendment claim was merited because the prison's total
disregard of any GID treatment (as distinguished from Supre and Lamb,
where at least some medical remedies were afforded to the inmates)
constituted a "deliberate indifference." 22 However, the court emphasized
of treatment,such
that the inmate did not have a right to any particulartype
123
as hormones, which were the focus of her complaint.
This case created a respectable baseline for prison liability where
there is an egregious instance of deliberate indifference towards a prisoner's
GID. Further, Supre and Lamb support the proposition that at least minimal
medical attention is necessary. 124 However, these rulings do not go far
enough in addressing the needs of prisoners with GID. The rhetoric of these
cases creates loose standards that rely largely on the deference of prison
officials.
In other cases, courts have been downright offensive to the
detriment of inmates with GID. In Maggert v. Hanks, infra note 125, a
prisoner's claim for GID treatment was denied by the district court and
affirmed on appeal because the prisoner did not establish a genuine issue of
fact. 125 Echoing much of the same rhetoric as the judge in Meriwhether, the
court chose to elaborate on the topic of GID civil rights litigation for future
reference. 126 The court's tone with regard to GID was aggressive. It
explained, "[s]omeone eager to undergo this mutilation is plainly suffering
from a profound psychiatric disorder."' 127 The court also stated that the
"cure" for GID can range from psychiatric treatment to hormone therapy to
surgical procedure, but prisons do not have a duty to authorize curative
treatment for GID such as hormonal therapy or surgery. 128 The analysis
proceeded:
118 Id. at 408-09.
119 Id. at 409.
120 See id. at 411-12.
121 See id. at 412-13.
122 See id. at 413-14 (citing Supre v. Rickets, 792 F.2d 958, 960 (10th Cir. 1986);
Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351, 354 (D. Kan. 1986)).
123 Id. at 413 (emphasis added)
124 See Supre, 792 F.2d at 963; Lamb, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 353-54.
125 131 F.3d 670, 670-71 (7th Cir. 1997).
126 See id. at 671.
127 d.

128 See id.
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Withholding from a prisoner an esoteric medical treatment
that only the wealthy can afford does not strike us as a form
of cruel and unusual punishment. It is not unusual; and we
cannot see what is cruel about refusing a benefit to a person
who could not have obtained the benefit if he had refrained
from committing crimes. We do not want transsexuals
committing crimes because it is the only route to obtaining
a cure.

129

In Maggert,although the court acknowledged that sex reassignment
surgery was a successful, complete form of treatment for the inmate's
gender dysphoria, the court ruled that that prisons are not required to
provide such treatment. 3 ' This case creates a contrary line of precedent
from Kosilek. The court elaborated, "[a] prison is not required by the Eighth
Amendment to give a prisoner medical care that is as good as he would
receive if he were a free person, let alone an affluent free person."9 9 Judge
Posner opined that neither Medicare nor standard health plans pay for such
surgeries, and concluded, "[w]ithholding from a prisoner an esoteric
medical treatment that only the wealthy can afford does not strike us as a
form of cruel and unusual punishment. . . . We do not want transsexuals
committing crimes because it is the only route to obtaining a cure." 13' 1
Clearly, the courts still come short of setting fair standards. Further,
it appears that no clear standard has taken hold of this line of cases. The
most controversial cases arise when prisoners with GID bring suit to
request court orders for reassignment surgeries rather than more cost
effective remedies such as hormone treatment. Politicians largely reject
supporting such measures for fear that their constituents will adversely react
to that particular use of tax dollars. 3 2 Moreover, the public and media
"regularly ridiculed the idea that a murderer could ever be entitled to such
'bizarre' treatment." '33 Thus, the traditional reaction of the courts has been
to reject any such claim. In fact, to issue an injunction for a sex
reassignment surgery has been branded "unprecedented."' 34
The Kosilek case is obviously unique and has elicited an ample
amount of criticism. It was considered "unprecedented" for the court to
grant the Plaintiffs request for full-blown sex reassignment surgery.13
129 1d. at 672.

130

Id. at 671.

Tarzwell, supra note 99, at 187 (quoting Maggert, 131 F.3d at 671).
See Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 215 (D. Mass. 2012)
133 Id. at 203.
134 Id. at 196.
131 See id. at 196-97, 250-5 1.
131

132
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However, at least one other case has echoed the rhetoric of Judge Wolff,
supporting the precedent opposite of Maggert.'36 In that case, Phillips,
supra note 100, the court issued an injunction for continued hormone
therapy for an inmate with GID.137 The court recognized an exception to the
general rule that no specific treatment is requiredfor a prisoner with a GID
diagnosis. 38 In Phillips,the plaintiff took estrogen for seventeen years prior
to her incarceration. 39 But when the estrogen therapy was denied during
her imprisonment, she experienced a reversal of many female body
characteristics. 4 ° She had other adverse side effects such as bruising,
discomfort, depression, and vomiting as "parts of her body reverted to
looking and feeling characteristically male [while] plaintiff experience[d]
life as a female."''
The Phillips court issued a preliminary injunction
42
requiring the prison to provide the plaintiff with estrogen.
To many people, it seems counter-intuitive to provide "adequate
medical care" to prisoners while the average American citizen is guaranteed
no such right. 43 The Supreme Court has responded to such criticism:
To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to
provide for their own needs. Prisoners are dependent on the
State for food, clothing, and necessary medical care. A
prison's failure to provide sustenance for inmates ...may
actually produce physical 'torture or a lingering death.[]
Just as a prisoner may starve if not fed, he or she may
suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care. A
prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance,
including adequate medical care, is incompatible with the
concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized
144
society.
Further, there is a push to reinforce the rights of individuals with
GID in other areas of the world. For example, transgender advocates are

136

See Phillips v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 731 F. Supp. 792, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1990),
aff'd, 932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991).

Id.
138 See id.
at 799-800.
137

139
Id. at 793-94.
0
14
Id. at 794.
141 Id.at 800, n. 11.
142 Id.at 801.
13 Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 198 (D. Mass. 2012).
'4Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
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making a case for Medicaid to cover sex reassignment surgeries.'45 The law
largely adheres to a binary system of sex. 146 In fact, courts generally will
47
not recognize a mixed sex or sex alternate to pure male or female.1
Notably, courts will not recognize a person's transgender or chosen sex
until sex reassignment surgery is complete. 48 When this is the standard, it
seems radical that public health institutions continue to combat providing
sex reassignment that is, in many ways, legally necessary. While Judge
Posner's argument was supported by the lack of funding for sex
reassignment in many health plans and Medicaid, changes in these
standards could (and arguably should) occur as well.
Moreover, the plight of prisoners with GID is even more serious
than it is for those in the general public. The public is still coming to terms
with such alternate lifestyles. Many children and adolescents with gender
dysphoria are cast out from youth on. They are discriminated against and
often punished for nonconformities or influenced to drop out of school.' 4 9
They are disadvantaged from the start.' 50 As a result, transgendered
individuals are often filtered into "criminalized economies and [then] into
prison."'' 2 Transgendered individuals are disproportionately represented in
5
prisons.
When in prison, inmates with GID also experience a unique type of
domination and discrimination. They are often forced into sexual
arrangements with alpha inmates.' 53 They are also harassed at a terrifying
prevalence when other inmates disapprove of their lifestyles. 54 The unique
troubles of the transgendered community with legal and prison
administrations warrant particular attention.
In the context of GID in prisons, courts will do well to follow on
the same path that Judge Wolf paved in Kosilek v. Spencer. Otherwise,
prisons risk (and the courts implicitly sanction) subpar medical treatment
that flies in the face of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. While prisoners
are not free to choose their personal treatment remedies in an unregulated
manner, it is clear that there is no effective remedy for GID aside from full
141See

generally, Jerry L. Dasti, Advocating a Broader Understanding of the
Necessity of Sex-Reassignment Surgery Under Medicaid, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev.

1738 (2002).

146 1d.at 1742.
147Id.
148Id

141See Tarzwell,

supranote 99, at 171-72.

150See id.
151Id. at
152 Id.at

171, 176.
176.
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'
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Id. at 177.

176-79
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sex reassignment surgery in some cases. In these rare cases, in which
medical doctors prescribe the particular remedy as the sole effective
measure, sex reassignment surgery should at least be an option. After all, as
Justice Kennedy wrote:
[C]ourts must be sensitive to the State's interest in
punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation, as well as the
need for deference to experienced and expert prison
administrators faced with the difficult and dangerous task
of housing large numbers of convicted criminals. Courts
nevertheless must not shrink from their obligation to
enforce the constitutional rights of all persons, including
prisoners.155

'5

Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).

